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AFTERMATH OF BROWN SHOE
Reynolds Metals Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
309 F.2d 223 (D.C.Cir. 1962)
In 1956, Reynolds Metals, world's largest producer of aluminum foil,
acquired Arrow Brands, Inc., a company which specializes in converting
jumbo rolls of raw foil into smaller quantities of decorated foil which is
sold almost exclusively to the florist trade. Although Arrow was one of
200 converters, only eight of these dealt with florist foil.
The Federal Trade Commission ordered Reynolds to divest itself of
its new acquisition because the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.'
Reynolds appealed from this order on three grounds; (1) the production
and sale of decorative aluminum foil to the florist trade is not the relevant
line of commerce, (2) the acquisition does not violate the precepts of section
7, and (3) the order requiring Reynolds to divest itself of after-acquired-
property is a taking without due process within the meaning of the fifth
amendment. The court decided against Reynolds on the first two points,
but agreed that the divestiture need not be ordered. The court was con-
cerned primarily with the relevant line of commerce. Utilizing the criteria
set forth in Brown Shoe v. U.S.,2 the court agreed with the FTC that the
line of commerce was decorative foil used in the florist trade.
The instant case then arose under section 7 of the Clayton Act which
was enacted by Congress in 1914 to supplement the Sherman Anti-trust
Act of 1890,3 by permitting regulation of business activities before a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act occurred, and monopoly became a fact. Section 7,
however, was ineffective in attaining this object. By its terms and later
judicial interpretation, it covered only stock acquisitions where competition
was reduced between corporations.4 Thus to enjoin the acquisition of assets,
the government would have the burden of proving that such a merger would
violate the stricter precepts of the Sherman Act. As a consequence, many
industries became highly concentrated, particularly after World War 1I. 5
1 64 Stat. 1125 (1925), 15 U.S.C. 18 (1958).
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire . . . the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly...
2 Brown Shoe v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
3 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. 2 (1958).
4 Arrow-Hart and Hegeman Electric Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
5 Houghton, "Revelations and Paradoxes of Recent Anti-trust Decisions," 7 Anti-
Trust Bull. 733, 736 (1963).
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Congress closed this loophole in 1950, proscribing all mergers where the
tendency would be to lessen competition in any line of commerce.6
In the ten years following amendment, some 89 suits were filed, and
some 30 have been adjudicated.7 All deal with the three problems of rele-
vant geographic market, relevant line of commerce, or product market, the
tendency to lessen competition, or control the market. The courts have
uniformly declined to lay down any definite rules as to what the govern-
ment must prove in each of these three categories, preferring a more flex-
ible standard. Under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of
the Clayton Act, proving the existence of certain conduct such as price-
fixing may be sufficient for injunction, regardless of the business purposes
behind the conduct in question. In a section 7 case, however, economic
data becomes extremely important to proving or disproving violation, as
does past history of merger, and economic condition of the industry.
Merger is not a per se violation.
For example, although both Reynolds and the FTC agreed in the
instant case that the geographic area under consideration was the entire
United States, in many other cases this question has been hotly contested.
The court has in each case looked to the facts and the effect of the merger
in particular areas to determine the relevant geographic market. In Crown-
Zellerbach v. F.T.C.,s a paper manufacturer argued that the effect of the
merger should be judged over the whole United States west of the Missis-
sippi, the FTC argued for an eleven state area, but the court decided on a
three state area. Determination turned on distribution facilities of the two
companies, location of customers, and line up of the industry as a whole.
In the recent bank merger case,9 the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the
four county area surrounding Philadelphia was the relevant geographic
market. The banks had argued that they competed for business in the entire
northeastern United States, but the court, relying on Tampa Electric Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co.10 felt that the test should be the area in which the seller
operates and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies. Here
the four county area was used by a Pennsylvania statute to limit branching,
and deliniated the area in which the average customer would bank.
Although the determination of geographic market has given the courts
some pause, much more litigation has developed over deliniation of the
relevant line of commerce. The tests used in determining line of commerce
under the Clayton Act and relevant market under the Sherman Act were
different in the past, but are now essentially the same." However, in de-
6 Similar legislation had been proposed before; the decision in U.S. v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), apparently provided the necessary impetus for final
enactment.
7 Phillips and Hall, "Merger Litigation, 1951-1960," 6 Anti-Trust Bull. 19 (1961).
8 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
9 U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank, 83 Sup. Ct. 1715 (1963).
10 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
11 "Determination of relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of
:violation of the Clayton Act." U.S. v. DuPont, 353 U.S. 586, 193 (1957). The "legal
test governing product market definition is essentially the same under the Sherman
and Clayton Acts." Handler and Robinson, "A Decade of Administration of the
Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act," 61 Colum L Rev 629, 643 (1961).
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termining relevant line of commerce, courts have relied on definitions
derived in Sherman Act cases as to what constitutes relevant market and
vice versa.
In U.S. v. DuPont (the cellophane case),12 the criteria was determined
to be reasonable interchangeability with other products, based on cross-
elasticities of demand, or "how far buyers will go to substitute one com-
modity for another."'13 It was shown that buyers were quite willing to shift
from cellophane to other flexible packaging materials as price fluctuated.
In the next year, in deciding an old section 7 case,14 the Supreme Court
did not mention the criteria of the cellophane case, but determined that
automotive finishes had such "peculiar characteristics and uses"' 5 to make
them a line of commerce within the meaning of the Clayton Act. Inter-
national Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. U.S.,16 a section 2 case, cited both of
the latter cases and stated that championship boxing was analogous to the
peculiar characteristics of auto fabrics and finishes which would bring it
within the Clayton Act line of commerce.17 In U.S. v. Columbia Pictures
Corp.,18 the line of commerce was found to be all forms of television pro-
gramming material, and reasonable interchangeability was equated with lack
of peculiar characteristics and uses. In American Crystal Sugar v. Cuban
American Sugar Co.,' 9 cane and beet sugars, although of different prices,
were considered to be part of one market because of the high degree of
interchangeability. However, in U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,20 a section
7 case, it was noted that "there can be a substantial lessening of competition
with respect to a product whether or not there are reasonable interchange-
able substitutes.' 2 ' Nonetheless it has been argued that if a product has
sufficiently peculiar characteristics and uses to be a distinct line of com-
merce, it is not reasonably interchangeable with other products.
22
The Supreme Court in the only post-1950 merger case, Brown Shoe,
23
was inclined to agree with the Bethlehem Steel court. It felt that while the
concepts of cross-elasticities of demand and reasonable interchangeability
might mark the outer limits of a general market, sub-markets may exist
which are important for anti-trust purposes.
Boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by examining
such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the sub-
market as a separate economic entity, the products peculiar charac-
12 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
13 Ibid. at 393. This approach was first developed in Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594 (1953), a Sherman Act case.
14 U.S. v. DuPont, 353 U.S. 586 (1957), the General Motors Case.
15 Id. at 593.
16 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
17 Id. at 252 n. 8.
's Trade Reg. Rep. (1960 Trade Cas.) 69766 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1960).
19 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir 1958).
20 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
21 Id. at 593, n. 36.
22 Handler and Robinson, supra note 11 at 64748.
23 Supra note 2.
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teristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers,
distinct prices .... 24
Using this indicia the Supreme Court found the relevant markets to be
men's, women's and children's shoes.25
Similarly, by looking at "industry or public recognition of the sub-
market as a separate economic entity," "distinct customers," and "distinct
prices," the court in the instant case found the relevant line of commerce
to be aluminum foil used in the florist trade. Only eight converters sold
to the some 700 wholesale outlets and only these outlets purchased from the
eight. Furthermore, the price of florist foil was significantly lower ($.75-.85
per unit) than other decorative foil ($1.15-1.22). The court felt that no
prudent business man would pay a higher price if the submarket were not
a distinct entity. Thus the relevant line of commerce was florist foil.
The second issue was whether the acquisition of Arrow would tend to
substantially lessen competion in the florist trade. Again the problem was
one of standards, or tests for measuring legality. Since the language of
section 7 is virtually that of section 3 of the Clayton Act,26 it had been
thought that Congress intended that the same judicially determined tests
for illegality under that section were to be used for determining a section 7
violation. The test at that time (1950) was one of quantitative substan-
tiality developed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Standard Stations
case.27 However, the FTC rejected the test for section 7 cases at an early
date, and stated that each case would have to be determined by itself, using
economic and historical data.2 8
Since then each case has relied on a variety of factors in addition to
percentage of the market, 29 such as case of entry, 0 tendency of the in-
dustry towards concentration,31 availability of alternate sources of supply
for the buyer,3 2 or conversely, retail or wholesale outlets for the manu-
facturer, 3 the position of the industry after the merger, and the probable
future of the industry.3 4
Although the court does not discuss the point it is perhaps important
that this was a vertical merger. Until the Brown Shoe case, most adjudi-
24 Id. at 325.
25 While the government argued against dividing the relevant market into higher
and lower priced shoes in Brown, in AG Spalding Brothers Inc. v. FTC 301 F.2d 585
(3d Cir. 1962), it succeeded in arguing for such a deliniation in various lines of sport-
ing goods.
26 15 U.S.C. 14 (1958).
27 Standard Oil v. U.S., 337 U.S. 293 (1949). The phrase means that if exclusive
dealing agreements embrace a substantial share of the market (6.7%), the court need
not inquire into domination or effect on competition. This rigid standard appears to
have become more flexible however, cf. Tampa Electric, supra note 10.
28 Pillsbury Mill Inc., 50 FTC 555 (1953).
29 AG Spalding, supra note 25; Crown Zellerback, supra note 8.
30 Id,; American Crystal Sugar, supra note 19, Bethlehem Steel, supra note 20.
31 AG Spalding, ibid.; Bethlehem Steel, ibid.
32 Crown Zellerbach, supra note 8; Bethlehem Steel, ibid.
33 AG Spalding, supra note 25.
34 Brown Shoe, supra note 2.
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cated mergers had been horizontal,3 5 that is a merger among retailers or
wholesalers, or manufacturers. Although Brown Shoe had horizontal
aspects, it was the vertical aspect, that is the merger of two manufacturers
with retail outlets, which posed the greatest threat to competition in an
industry characterized by such a tendency to integrate. The implications of
that case, moreover, seem to proscribe vertical mergers involving leaders
of an industry.
At any rate, Arrow being one of eight converters and having 33% of
the market before acquisition is now acquired by what the court calls "a
rich parent" with a "deep pocket." It noted that although Reynolds' com-
petition lost 33% of the florist foil trade because of the removal of Arrow,
the more important anti-competitive effect would be felt by Arrow's com-
petitors. Having a rich parent, Arrow was in a position to cut prices below
cost to its competitors.
The court noted that all that need be shown was the capacity to cut
prices, or potentiality of lessened competition, and not that this effect had
actually been achieved. The court did observe however, that the sales of
five of Arrow's competitors had dropped from 14% to 47% below 1955
sales in two years. Meanwhile, Arrow's sales had increased 18.9%. Thus
the potentiality was somewhat realized.
The court agreed that Reynolds and Arrow would have to be divorced,
yet it also felt that the Commission did not have the power to require that
Reynolds divest itself of a new plant it had built for Arrow, and the fixtures
therein. It did not reach the question of whether this would be a taking
without due process within the meaning of the fifth amendment, and left
open the question of whether in a case of dire necessity such a divestiture
of after-acquired-property would be warranted. Here, there was no such
necessity; competition could be restored without invoking such a harsh
remedy.
Thus the court by applying Brown Shoe's list of criteria for determin-
ing relevant submarkets, in a mechanical fashion concluded in short order
that decorative foil used in the florist trade was the relevant line of com-
merce. Having done this, its problem of determining whether competition
would be lessened became simple, due to Arrow's large share of the market.
Although there will always be factual problems in determining line of com-
merce or submarket involved, Brown Shoe does lay down helpful guide-
lines for weighing various economic factors in a section 7 case.
35 The notable exception being DuPont, supra note 14.
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